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The Essence of Libety

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Liberty knows no compromise

by Murray N. Rothbard

Chapter 24: The Moral Status of Relations to the State

Compiled and Edited

by

Dr. Jimmy T. (Gunny) LaBaume

If the State is a criminal organization, its moral status is radically different from that of just property-owners. And the moral status of contracts with the State differs radically as well. No one is morally required to obey the State. With all of its income derived from the crime of taxation, the State cannot possess any just property . It cannot be immoral to fail to pay taxes, appropriate State property, refuse to obey the State's orders or to break a contract with it. Morally, “stealing” from the State is removing property from criminal hands. In a sense it is “homesteading” the property by removing it from the criminal sector of society, which is a positive good.

An exception would be where the State has stolen property that clearly belongs to a specific person. For example, if the State confiscates jewels belonging to Brown and then Green steals them from the State, he is not committing a crime—although Brown would be justified in using force to repossess the jewels from Green. Most of the time, however, the State's confiscations, are in the form of taxation making it impossible to point to specific owner(s) of the property. In these majority cases, theft or “homesteading” from the State would be legitimate.

Lying to the State is also morally legitimate. For example, no one is morally bound to tell a robber the truth when he asks if there are any valuables. In the same way, no one is morally bound to the truth when filling out the State's income tax returns.

None of this means, however, that it would be prudently wise to openly lie, steal or cheat the State—considering the level of force capability that it possesses. It does mean, on the other hand, that these actions are just and morally licit. So, relations with the State are totally prudential and pragmatic for the specific individuals. The State must be treated as an enemy with currently prevailing power.

Consider the question of default or repudiation of government debt. Many hold that the government is morally bound to pay its debts. But since the government has no money of its own, payment of its debt means that taxpayers are further coerced into paying bondholders. The purchase of a government bond is simply making an investment in the future loot from the robbery of taxation—the bondholder a willing investor in future robbery.

Consider the problem of breaking contracts with the State. Since enforceable contracts are title-transfers and not promises, it would be legitimate in the free society to resign from an army despite the signing of a voluntary contract. Contract considerations would apply only to private armies in the free market. State armies are criminal aggressors. Therefore, it would be morally licit to leave the State's army at any time.

Consider the question of bribery of government officials. In a free society, the briber is acting legitimately whereas the bribee is defrauding someone (an employer). On the other hand, when considering bribery of government officials, a distinction must be made between “aggressive” and “defensive” bribery. For example, if a Mafioso bribes police to exclude other, competing gambling casinos, he is acting in collaboration with the government to coerce and is, therefore, an accessory to governmental aggression. On the other hand, if gambling casinos are outlawed and he bribes the police to allow his casino to operate, this is a “defensive bribe” and is perfectly legitimate.

As a matter of fact, defensive bribery often performs an important social function. For example, in many countries business could not be transacted without bribery. It allows destructive regulations to be avoided. So, a “corrupt government” is not necessarily a bad thing. It can at least allow a partial flowering of voluntary exchange in a society. However, in either case, both the regulations and the enforcement officials are unjustified since neither should be in existence at all.

Further, a private individual's “right to privacy” or right to keep silent does not apply to government officials. Their records and operations should be open to public scrutiny. There are two democratic arguments for this. First, the public can only decide on public issues and vote for public officials if they have complete knowledge of government operations. And second, since the taxpayers pay the bill, they have the right to know what government is doing. The libertarian would add that government is an aggressor against the rights and persons of its citizens. Therefore, full disclosure must be wrest from the State—information which its citizens may be able to use to resist or whittle down the State's power.

Another area where the law now distinguishes between private citizens and public officials is the law of libel. As we saw above, libel laws are illegitimate. But, it is important to distinguish between a private citizen and a government official or agency. Fortunately, libel laws have been weakened when applied to government in general and politicians in particular.

Many claim that it is immoral to vote or to engage in political action. The argument goes that by participating in State activity, one places his moral imprimatur upon the State apparatus. However, a moral decision must be a free decision and the State has placed individuals in society in an un-free environment. So, in an environment of State coercion, voting does not necessarily imply voluntary consent.

So, the State is not a legitimate social institution albeit a bumbling and inefficient one. Instead, it is an inherently illegitimate institution of organized aggression and crime against its subject's persons and property. Rather than being a social necessity, it is profoundly antisocial. It lives as a parasite off of the productive activities of its citizens. Morally, it is illegitimate and outside of the libertarian legal system, which insures the rights and properties of private citizens. Conclusion: from the standpoint of justice and morality, the State can not own property, require obedience, or enforce any contract made with it. In fact, it cannot exist at all.

Rothbard recognized the necessity and the great advantages to living in society and participating in the social division of labor. However, he points out that the “great non sequitur committed by defenders of the State…is to leap from the necessity of society to the necessity of the State. ‘ Society' is a convenient label for the voluntary interrelations of individuals, in peaceful exchange and on the market. …All of the services commonly thought to require the State…can be and have been supplied far more efficiently and certainly more morally by private persons. The State is in no sense required by the nature of man; quite the contrary.”

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